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the California Department of Health Services (DHS). [14:1 CRLR 165] OMBC is
required to adopt the DHS guidelines and
ensure that its licensees are notified that
knowing failureto follow themconstitutes
grounds for disciplinary action. Although
OMBC had previously approved a motion
directing the preparation of infection control guidelines, the Board's fiscal crisis
has prevented action.
Also at the July meeting, OMBC elected
public member Ronald Kaldor to serve as
President, Richard Bond, DO, to serve as
Vice-President, and Laurie Woll, DO to
serve as Secretary/Treasurer.
0
FUTURE MEETINGS
December 3 in Sacramento.

sion of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA),
charged with representing the long-term
interests of all utility ratepayers; and the
Division of Strategic Planning, which examines changes in the regulatory environment and helps the Commission plan future policy. In February 1989, the Commission created a new unified Safety Division. This division consolidated all of
the safety functions previously handled in
other divisions and put them under one
umbrella. The Safety Division is concerned with the safety of the utilities, railway transports, and intrastate railway systems.
Members of the Commission include
Daniel Win. Fessler, President, Patricia M.
Eckert, Norman D. Shumway, P. Gregory
Conlon, and Jessie J. Knight, Jr.
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PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION
Executive Director:
Neal J. Shulman
President: Daniel Win. Fessler
(415) 703-1487

T

he California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was created in 1911 to
regulate privately-owned utilities and ensure reasonable rates and service for the
public. Today, under the Public Utilities
Act of 1951, Public Utilities Code section
201 et seq., the PUC regulates the service
and rates of more than 43,000 privatelyowned utilities and transportation companies. These include gas, electric, local and
long distance telephone, radio-telephone,
water, steam heat utilities and sewer companies; railroads, buses, trucks, and vessels transporting freight or passengers;
and wharfingers, carloaders, and pipeline
operators. The Commission does not regulate city- or district-owned utilities or
mutual water companies.
It is the duty of the Commission to see
that the public receives adequate service
at rates which are fair and reasonable, both
to customers and the utilities. Overseeing
this effort are five commissioners appointed by the Governor with Senate approval. The commissioners serve staggered six-year terms. The PUC's regulations are codified in Chapter 1, Title 20 of
the California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The PUC consists of several organizational units with specialized roles and responsibilities. A few of the central divisions are: the Advisory and Compliance
Division, which implements the Commission's decisions, monitors compliance
with the Commission's orders, and advises the PUC on utility matters; the Divi-

MAJOR PROJECTS
Public Comment on the PUC's Proposed Restructuring of California's
Electric Services Industry. In April

1994, the PUC outlined a major proposal
to alter its method of regulating electric
utilities. [14:2&3 CRLR 215; 14:1 CRLR
170] The proposed new approach isolates
for close regulation the necessarily monopolistic transmission of electricity (e.g.,
through power lines and transformers),
and deregulates power generation. The
proposal is based on the theory that, with
the advent of smaller and varied types of
generators able to produce competitively
priced electricity and the transferability of
electricity over greater distances, generation is not necessarily a "natural monopoly," but can be separated out for competition-which could enhance efficiency
and lower costs. The PUC has argued that
cheaper power going to other states is one
reason California consumers pay rates
which are 50% higher than the United
States average.
Two elements of the proposed plan
involve, respectively, "retail wheeling"
and "performance-based ratesetting." Retail wheeling allows the consumer to buy
power from alternative power generators-the local utility, an out-of-town utility, a power broker, or an independent
producer. The selected supplier would deliver the electricity to the local utility, and
the local utility would distribute or "wheel"
it to the customer or business through the
existing network of power lines. The local
utility would receive a fee for delivering
the power, while the supplier would receive a larger fee for generation costs.
Local utilities which do not offer a competitive price for power generation would
become little more than the transportation
link in the power chain. This option,
dubbed by the PUC "direct access," would
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be available to consumers according to the
following timetable:
-Large industrial consumers could become direct access consumers on January
1, 1996.
-Commercial consumers receiving
service at the primary level could become
direct access consumers on January 1,
1997.
-Commercial consumers receiving
service at the secondary level could become direct access consumers on January
1, 1998.
-All commercial consumers could become direct access consumers after January 1, 1999.
-All remaining consumers could become direct access consumers after January 1,2002. Alternatively, consumers may
continue to receive electricity service
from their local utility in the traditional
manner, with prices regulated by the PUC.
The second part of the Commission's
plan would implement performancebased ratesetting (PBR). PBR allows the
utilities' rates to be set according to an
average market price for electricity. If the
utility is able to generate or purchase electricity for less than the benchmark price,
the savings are split between the ratepayers and the utility's stockholders. This approach eliminates the current ratesetting
system which examines the utility's costs
item by item and sets rates to allow the
utility a reasonable profit. Under PBR, if
the utility does not become more efficient,
the losses are split between ratepayers and
stockholders as well. The system is intended to provide an incentive for the utilities to streamline their operations and increase their efficiency. Under the Commission's proposal, utilities would be allowed to collect the costs of past uneconomic generating assets developed under the
old regulatory framework from both direct
access and traditional consumers. Currently, three of the major electricity utilities in California have submitted proposals for PBR, and the Commission recently
approved an extension of the two-year
trial PBR program for San Diego Gas &
Electric Company (see below).
Since its April 20 introduction of the
proposal, the Commission has been holding public hearings and inviting comment
on the precedent-setting plan. The state's
two major utility consumer groups-San
Diego-based Utility Consumers' Action
Network (UCAN) and San Franciscobased Toward Utility Rate Normalization
(TURN)-submitted comments or testified at the hearings. Both organizations
predicted discrimination against residential ratepayers who have the fewest alternative options. UCAN and TURN contend
19'
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that where some customers have competitive alternatives and others do not, producers exploit those with no choice to gain
competitive advantage with those being
courted by others. Where energy providers have high fixed costs and must operate
at full capacity, the large industrial power
users are likely to get the benefit of marginal cost pricing-very low prices just
over the out-of-pocket cost of fuel or other
generation means.
In other words, the consumer groups
argued that it would be irrational for producers not to price at a marginal cost level
for industrial and then commercial customers as each is phased into competitive
choice. Until choice is allowed, the utility
has a captive consumer, but as each group
is phased in and allowed to choose a nonutility power source competing with utility power sources, that consumer will be
lost to the utility if its price cannot be
matched. Where a utility is operating an
oil, nuclear, hydro or other plant at close
to full capacity, any reduction in volume
means that the same overhead costs must
be paid by the smaller group of customers
remaining, meaning higher unit costs and
higher rates. The only way to maintain
efficiencies for the benefit of all ratepayers is to lower prices to retain those customers able to leave-down to the actual
marginal (out-of-pocket) cost of burning
the fuel or otherwise providing the power.
This means that the group last in lineresidential consumers-will bear most of
the overhead and other fixed costs as the
process unwinds.
Further, if marginal cost pricing fails
or is disallowed by the Commission, and
a utility powerplant loses so many large
customers it is "uneconomic," the remaining captive ratepayers may have to pay the
cost of maintaining a plant operating at
low utilization, or bail out the utility by
amortizing and paying the costs of abandoning an uneconomic plant. TURN has
asked the PUC to reject "retail wheeling"
unless it can demonstrate that it will serve
the interests of small business and residential ratepayers. Alternatively, TURN proposes to foster competition at the wholesale level, requiring the monopoly utilities
to buy electricity at the lowest available
price from independent power producers
rather than expanding their own plants.
Under this alternative scenario, competitive power would be phased in as current
plants age and as increased population and
use creates new demand; the savings
achieved would be passed onto all ratepayers, not merely those placed first in
line and advantageously presented with
the momentous bargaining power that alternative choices create.

On June 14 and 15, the Commission
held two days of hearings on the plan at
the Los Angeles Convention Center, focusing on its likely effects on low-income
assistance programs, economic development programs, low-emission vehicle programs, fuel diversity, demand-side management, energy conservation, and renewable resources. The listed topics involve
areas of current or possible regulatory
"cross-subsidy," where rates are designed
to provide socially beneficial incentives.
Critics at the hearings argued that, in some
cases, as with energy conservation and
renewable resources, cross-subsidies may
correct serious free market flaws-for example, the external long-range costs implicit in the exhaustion of nonrenewable
resources. Where the revised system eschews cross-subsidies in favor of straight
efficiency and lowest costs, it does not
calculate the fact that the market's lowest
cost may not be the true cost; there are
costs the producers may be passing onto
future generations which an imperfect
marketplace will fail to assess or adequately ameliorate.
Utilities are currently required by regulation to obtain a percentage of their electricity from alternative sources which are
more environmentally friendly than traditional fossil fuel-based sources, including
a new generation of natural gas turbine
generators which promise high cost-efficiency. Such alternative sources traditionally carry higher generation costs in the
open market, resulting in less energy
being generated through renewable, pollution-free, environmentally preferable
methods where the market and legal systems fail to assess producers the total and
long run costs their production methods
impose on others. Environmental critics
have rejected one Commission alternative
as a public relations distraction: allowing
consumers to check a box on their electricity bill saying that they want their energy
generated by alternative sources. A market-based alternative suggested by environmentalists would assess a tax or cost to
each method of production based on the
additional and currently unassessed costs
each imposes on the environment or on
future generations; they argued that such
a solution allows the market to allocate
resources efficiently, while correcting for
its external cost avoidance flaw.
Environmentalists and labor groups
expressed additional concerns that some
of the cheaper power available through
deregulation will come from producers in
other states with minimal environmental
standards and which burn nonrenewable
resources, resulting in increased pollution.
Utilities countered that substantial energy

in California comes from oil-generated
sources, and additional emissions in nonCalifornia locations is more benign than
in populous California, with its automobile exhaust and atmospheric inversion
layer problems.
On June 15, the Commission released
a letter from U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel
R. O'Leary, who questioned the Commission's ability to unilaterally implement its
far-reaching plan given the jurisdiction of
federal regulators. Under the 1992 Energy
Policy Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over
wholesale transmission rates, while the
PUC has jurisdiction over retail rates. The
authority problem is raised directly by the
PUC plan, as advantageous wheeling
would appear to involve FERC jurisdiction and it is unclear who has jurisdiction
over "retail wheeling." Susan Tierney, assistant secretary for domestic and international energy policy with the Department
of Energy, buttressed O'Leary's letter
with testimony at the June 15 hearing,
describing the plan as "a high-risk legal
position for California." Commission staff
contended that the plan was not offered as
"an order" because of the need to cooperate and coordinate with many actors, including the federal jurisdiction.
The Commission held additional fullpanel hearings throughout the summer
and fall of 1994, including hearings on
July 1 in Sacramento, August 4 in San
Francisco (focusing on wholesale electric
markets), and September 7 in San Diego.
Interested parties appearing at the hearings have included representatives of Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E),
Southern California Edison (SCE), San
Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E),
and the Consumer Alliance for Electricity
Rate Reductions (CAERR), a disparate
group including TURN, UCAN, the California Large Energy Users Association,
and the Agricultural Energy Consumers
Association. Two additional and important consumer organizations weighed in on
the PUC's plan during the late summer:
Consumer Action, a San Francisco consumer organization, and Consumers First,
a coalition of California ratepayers started
by Jim Conran, former Manager for Consumer Affairs and Public Issues at Pacific
Bell and subsequently Director of the state
Department of Consumer Affairs. On August 31, they held a joint forum in San
Diego to brief consumer organizations on
the issues prior to the Commission's September 7 San Diego hearing.
At the hearings, PG&E argued for a
further delay of six years, until 2008, to
phase in residential consumers, and promised in return that the ratepayers would not
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have to pay for the transition costs of
uneconomic past investments (such as the
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Powerplant), and
that rates would not be increased for retail
customers. SDG&E argued for a more modest delay (until 2005), and for the creation
of a competitive wholesale power-generation market, including a wholesale pool of
resources.
CAERR argued that the utilities' proposed extensions would mean an additional six years where residential consumers are likely to bear disproportionately
high rates given their lack of choice and
the economic facts discussed above, and
that if costs decline under the plan, residential ratepayers should be paying less,
not paying the same amount to disproportionately cover utility fixed costs
while industry and commercial users pay
much less. Further, CAERR argued that
by standing last in line, residential consumers-who already lack the bargaining
power of large industrial users-would
find advantageous terms foreclosed and
be left with the producers rejected by the
large users.
CAERR released a report prepared by
Economic Sciences Corporation (ESC),
an independent consulting firm, which
compares operating costs of California's
utilities to 100 comparable utility companies in other states. ESC's report concluded that California consumers paid
$6.4 billion more in 1992 than the average
rate of the other 100 utilities. CAERR
called upon all California utilities to cut
electric rates by 25% by 2000. In response,
the utilities contended that California's
high rates are the result of excessive regulation, and the inability to use cheap coalfired generators.
SCE argued that retail competition
should be postponed indefinitely. The utility proposed the creation of an independent energy purchasing company (called
"POOLCO") which would buy from all
comers-utilities and independents-to
stimulate the wholesale market for energy.
The CAERR group of energy consumers does not appear to oppose the concept
of applying competition to energy production and purchase; its focus appears to be
on the details which it contends favor the
utilities and industrial users. CAERR objects particularly to the abandonment of
conservation incentives for free market
principles of maximum consumption, the
undermining of various extant cross-subsidies for low-income people, and such
add-ons as a "competition transition charge"
applied to users of retail wheeling to compensate utilities for their displacement
costs and likely to inhibit or even preclude
cost savings. CAERR also argues that the

price design which distinguishes what the
plan terms "direct access" customers
(those able to contract and wheel) from
"utility service" customers (residential
and other customers dependent upon the
utility) favors further the large users.
CAERR's message is that the Commission, in a frenzy to obtain the political
support of (or to neutralize) the utilities
and industry, is prepared to give them the
brunt of the system's gain.
Commission staff contend privately
that the system's gain is sufficient to afford advantage to all, and that if powerful
interests receive a disproportionate benefit in the short run, in the process they have
surrendered significant monopoly powerhenceforward subject to marketplace efficiencies and discipline. The Commission's
argument is that add-on cross-subsidies,
conservation, and external cost assessment are not precluded where strong regulatory presence remains and the distribution system remains subject to regulation.
Perhaps a short-run reward goes to the
utilities who will suffer extraordinary displacement cost and risks, others do not
affirmatively lose in the bargain, and all
will gain substantially once competition is
established over the long run.
In addition to the utilities, environmental and consumer groups, major power
users, and the federal government, the passage of ACR 143 (Sher) (Chapter 148,
Resolutions of 1994) portends the California legislature's entry into the electric deregulation debate. ACR 143 creates the
Joint Oversight Committee on Lowering
Electricity Costs, to be chaired by respected
Assemblymember Byron Sher. The Committee may develop legislation which could
facilitate-or impede-the Commission's
proposed deregulation plan, and which will
specifically examine performance-based
ratemaking, direct access to markets in
other states (and federal law conflicts),
and proposed transition surcharges and
their allocation among classes of customers. The Committee will report on the "financial status" of the utilities, and submit
options for funding low-income ratepayer
assistance, fuel diversity, conservation,
women- and minority-owned business opportunity, low-emission vehicle development, and environmental protection programs (see LEGISLATION).
The Commission has countered by
scheduling an expanded series of "public
participation" hearings in San Jose on
September 20, Fresno on September 26,
Pasadena on September 27, Bakersfield
on November 1, Ventura on November 2,
Garden Grove on November 2, Carson on
November 3, San Bernardino on November 9, and Huntington Park on November
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19. Thus far, the agenda for these extensive proceedings does not appear to involve consideration of a proposed "order"
or "rule" or any other vehicle capable of
legal effect. It appears that the arrangement of such an order requires coordination with the legislature-where numerous existing statutory provisions are implicated-and with the federal government. No action is expected until early
1995, but the PUC plan's concept remains
quite alive.
Performance-Based Ratesetting Extended by Commission for SDG&E. On
August 3, the PUC adopted a rate decision
proposed by Administrative Law Judge
Mark Wetzell. The adoption is particularly
significant as a precedential exercise of the
Commission's new "performance-based
ratesetting" approach. [14:2&3 CRLR 216]
As noted above, PBR establishes a target
market price and then allows the utility to
keep a portion of the savings if its costs
decline, or requires it to accept less if its
costs are higher; in both cases, the difference is shared between the stockholders
owning the utility and ratepayers. The
concept is to replicate the natural marketplace, which rewards efficiency gain and
punishes inefficiency.
SDG&E, a strong supporter of PBR,
had previously won a two-year pilot project to set performance-based rates in 1993;
the current proceeding sought to refine
and extend the rates until 1999. It should
be noted that the electric power generation
deregulation proposal discussed above is
independent of performance-based ratesetting; it would be just as feasible (and,
consumer advocates argue, more judicious) to maintain traditional fair rate of
return maximum rate regulation to the monopoly power distribution system. But the
Commission has joined the two concepts
politically, and the adoption of the alternative and allegedly more market-like new
ratesetting system constitutes another step
in the PUC's new policy direction.
UCAN, the major proponent of consumers at the rate hearing to extend
SDG&E's PBR pilot project, argued that
SDG&E had rigged the target and indicators to assure excessive profits for its
stockholders. UCAN contended that substantial efficiency gain would be achieved
from the mere increase in usage due to
population gain within a high fixed cost
plant, and that stockholder enrichment beyond a fair rate of return was being sought
from this and other factors unrelated to
improved performance. UCAN argued
that the utility had already received a
$57.4 million rate increase in the first PBR
proceeding in 1993. and that the pending
SDG&E rate request would add 4-5% per
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year until 1999, accomplishing a largely
unjustified $250 million in additional
profits to the utility.
ALJ Wetzell's proposed decision was
announced on July 1, and was agreed to
by the U.S. Navy (SDG&E's utility's largest customer) and by the PUC's Division
of Ratepayer Advocates. Notwithstanding
vigorous legal and public dissent by
UCAN, it was adopted without significant
alteration by the full Commission on August 3. The final decision allows earnings
greater than 1% above SDG&E's authorized rate of return to be shared equally
between shareholders and ratepayers.
Earnings greater than 3% above the authorized rate of return will trigger PUC
rate review. If earnings fall upto 3% below
the authorized rate of return, the shareholders absorb the deficiency; a return
lower than that level would trigger a rate
review for possible rate increases. Under
traditional rate of return analysis, a monopoly must also bear deficiencies below
authorized rates of return (and may seek
rate increases), but-unlike the performance-based alternative-if there is profit
beyond the authorized level, the utility
does not keep it; rates are reexamined and
lowered to benefit ratepayers. Utilities are
rewarded for improved performance by
conferring rate of return increases, and by
allowing them to retain efficiency-generated increases during the year earned.
Joined by TURN, UCAN condemned
the decision as a windfall for the utility
and an abdication of the Commission's
responsibility to ratepayers who are subject to monopoly power. UCAN's Michael
Shames argued that energy bills could increase well over the $5 increase anticipated in each monthly bill by 1998; he
argued that the approved rates will allow
SDG&E to raise rates by as much as $312
million and boost profits by 25%, and
without necessarily achieving any efficiencies from its own devices. The utility
applauded the decision, describing it as
the most comprehensive experiment in the
nation in performance-based ratemaking.
SDG&E's Tom Page contended that the
utility could achieve $19 million more, or
$21 million less, than its target rate of
return and that the outcome would depend
upon its cost control success and performance in employee safety, customer satisfaction, system reliability, and rate comparison.
Biennial Resource Plan Update: Bid
Awards Announced. On June 22, the
PUC announced that the state's independent power industry would be allowed to
supply electricity to California consumers. The Biennial Resource Plan Update
(BRPU) was first proposed in 1986 as a

means of adding alternative energy to the
utility power grid. The allowance of
cogeneration from sources outside the utility
is not new, but has ebbed and flowed as
varying oil and nuclear costs, and litigation
by the utilities, has affected its viability. The
BRPU was designed to examine whether
independent companies using new technology could compete with California's private
utility power generation.
The Commission announced winning
bids from private independent power producers, including wind, geothenral, hydro,
biomass and waste (landfill gas) sources.
The average winning bid amounted to 33%
less than utility alternatives. Advocates for
alternative and renewable energy argue
that renewable energy may be more competitive than is widely believed, and the
bids suggest that substantial benefits can
accrue from competitive opportunities. Interestingly, the winner of the largest contract was a joint venture between PG&E
and the Bechtel Corporation (U.S. Generating Company) which will build a gasfired power plant to sell 712 megawatts
(MW) of power. Supporters of the BRPU
process, including TURN and the California Manufacturers Association, noted that
the PUC's acceptance of independently
provided power will add 500 MW of renewable energy capacity and will save
ratepayers $260 million annually.
Prior to the June 22 announcement,
those promoting independent power production and alternative energy sources
had complained bitterly that the Commission had abandoned the BRPU experiment. The award turned bitter commentary in the affected trade press to effusive
congratulatory prose for the PUC. The
results appear to provide substantial support for at least the electric deregulation
concept advanced by the Commission.
PUC Authorizes IntraLATA Competition, Higher Basic Rates. On July 20,
the PUC issued for public comment a new
proposed decision which raises the basic
monthly rate for telephone service from
$8.35 to $11.25 for Pacific Bell customers, and from $9.75 to $17.25 for GTE
California customers; decreases interLATA
(local toll calls of between 16 and 70 miles
within each of the state's eleven local
phone service areas) rates by as much as
40%; and allows long distance carriers
such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint to compete with PacBell and GTE in the intraLATA category of service. The PUC issued a similar order in 1993, but rescinded
that decision less than three weeks later
after it was revealed that a top-level Pacific Bell official helped write and edit the
draft decision on the evening before its
announcement, and engaged in unre-

ported ex pare communications with a
decisionmaker in violation of PUC rules
of procedure. [14:1 CRLR 166; 13:4 CRLR
203]
On September 15, the PUC adopted the
proposed decision, which is viewed by
many as being most beneficial to businesses and least beneficial to elderly, lowincome, and minority customers: according to the PUC's estimates, 50% of monthly
residential bills will rise by $0.42 or more.
Also, long distance carriers, as well as
consumer groups such as TURN, criticized the way in which consumers must
access the competing carriers for intraLATA service; to use a phone company
other than their basic service carrier for
local toll calls, customers will have to dial
a special five-digit access code. Critics
contend that Pacific Bell will have a builtin advantage over its competitors unless
customers can use any carrier without having to dial additional numbers; the PUC is
expected to conduct further research into
this "equal access" issue in future months.
The PUC's decision will take effect on
January 1, 1995.
PUC Initiates Proceedings to Streamline Regulations Governing Non-Monopoly Telephone Service Providers.
On February 3, the PUC instituted a joint
rulemaking and investigative proceeding
which would streamline regulations governing many telecommunications service
providers in California. The proceedings
center around a comprehensive revision of
the regulatory requirements for so-called
"nondominant" telephone corporations,
defined by the PUC as those which do not
possess the ability to harm consumers
through the exercise of market power.
This class of service providers does not
include AT&T, the dominant long distance
company, monopoly local exchange carriers (LECs) such as Pacific Bell and GTE
California, or cellular companies. The gist
of the revision would allow nondominant
telephone providers (NDTP) to avoid the
complex certification and tariff approval
process with a registration procedure,
which might be as simple as a one-page
form to be filed with the Commission. To
provide consumer safeguards, each business utilizing the registration process must
agree to be bound by the PUC's applicable
consumer protection standards, as well as
those of other state or local consumer protection agencies. Furthermore, the business must agree to enforcement of these
standards in the appropriate jurisdiction,
such as the small claims court in the locale
of the customer. [14:2&3 CRLR 216; 14:1
CRLR 168-69]
On July 13, staff presented the PUC
with a report entitled Consuner Protec-
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tions for Consumers of Non-Dominant
Telecommunications Providers: A Staff
Report to Commissioners, which contains
a comprehensive evaluation of the current
consumer protection systems available to
consumers of the services of NDTPs subject to the PUC's proposed order. Among
other things, the report provides an overview of the current consumer protection
system; reviews regulatory models which
may be applicable to NDTP issues; proposes a model consumer protection system aimed at addressing the changing conditions of a competitive marketplace; discusses consumer rights and responsibilities; and makes recommendations for an
effective consumer protection system.
The report indicates that the PUC needs to
ensure that the following elements are
made available to all NDTP consumers:
• Consumers must have accurate and
understandable information necessary to
make informed decisions about telecommunications services.
- Consumers contacting the Commission must receive a timely and knowledgeable response that outlines their options.
• Consumers' informal complaints must
receive an initial investigative response
from the PUC; Commission resources
must be adequate to conduct further investigations when warranted.
- Consumers must have a progressive
range of complaint resolution options, including alternative dispute resolution procedures.
- Consumers must be encouraged to
participate in PUC proceedings and provided the support necessary to do so.
* Commissioners and relevant staff
must be aware of consumer concerns,
problems, and opinions.
Acknowledging that such wide-sweeping reform is not within its authority under
existing law, the Commission sought
amendments to the Public Utilities Code
which would authorize it to waive the
certification and tariffing requirements for
registration of nondominant telephone
corporations. AB 3767 (Andal) would
have permitted the Commission to apply
"registration only" regulation to telephone
corporations without monopoly or significant market power; however, this bill died
in committee (see LEGISLATION). Because of the bill's failure, the Commission
may consider implementing alternative
legal procedures in the interim.
PUC Files Petition to Avoid Federal
Preemption of Cellular Regulation. On
December 17, 1993, the PUC opened an
investigation of the mobile telephone service industry to develop a comprehensive
regulatory framework designed to promote an orderly transition into a fully

competitive marketplace while assuring
that consumers are protected against unjust or unreasonable rates. [13:4 CRLR
205] On August 3, the PUC issued an
interim opinion in which it considered the
threshold question of whether current
market conditions for mobile telephone
services protect subscribers adequately
from unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rates, and consequently, whether continued state regulation of carriers is necessary to protect consumers. In its opinion,
the PUC concluded that the wholesale cellular telephone market currently remains
uncompetitive, and that, "[a]ccordingly,
state regulation of cellular carriers should
continue at least for the near term to protect consumers against unreasonable rates
while fostering the development of a competitive mobile telecommunications market."
In its opinion, the PUC explained that
significant change in federal regulation of
mobile service providers was initiated
with the passage of the federal Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which
amends section 332 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 to create a new
regulatory framework governing "commercial mobile radio service." On March
7, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued its "Second Report and
Order" addressing the implementation of
the 1993 Budget Act; as stated in the FCC
order, the intent of the Budget Act was to
replace traditional regulation of mobile
services with a comprehensive, consistent
framework. The Budget Act also preempts
state and local rate and entry regulation of
all commercial mobile radio services effective August 10, 1994; however, any
state with rate regulation in effect on June
1, 1993, may petition the FCC by August
10, 1994, to extend that authority based on
a showing that industry market conditions
fail to protect subscribers from unjust
rates, or that such service is substantially
a replacement for landline exchange service.
Accordingly, the PUC solicited evidence in its investigation on the degree of
competition currently existing in urban,
suburban, and rural California markets for
commercial mobile services; whether, in
each market, competitive conditions protect subscribers adequately from unjust
and unreasonable rates, or rates that are
unjustly discriminatory for commercial
mobile services; and where such market
conditions exist, whether commercial mobile service is a replacement for landline
telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the telephone landline exchange service within California markets.
Based upon the results of its investigation,
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the PUC concluded that "the cellular sector of the mobile services market continues to be uncompetitive which has perpetuated unreasonably high rates." Accordingly, the PUC decided to exercise its option under federal law to file a petition to
retain regulatory authority over cellular
carriers for an interim period of eighteen
months after September 1, 1994. In its
opinion, the PUC added that it is the
Commission's "expectation that the industry would have come under effective
competitive discipline by the end of this
period." However, at present, most markets have-at most-two competitors.
Large cellular carriers enjoying dispensation from both rate regulation and competition have aggressively sought federally
granted insulation from state or local regulation, similar to the privileges exercised
by the cable television industry. 19:4
CRLR 91
PUC's Allocation of Pacific Telesis
Spin-Off Refund Under Challenge. In
January 1994, ALJ Greggory Wheatland
asked for written comments from interested parties on the proposed disposition
of the $49 million fund established to
compensate ratepayers for the spin-off of
Pacific Telesis' wireless operations. Telesis was required to establish the fund as
one condition of the PUC's approval of the
spin-off, to compensate ratepayers for research and development costs of wireless
and cellular systems financed through
phone rates between 1974 and 1983. In its
spin-off decision, the PUC identified several alternative methods of allocating the
funds, including the funding of advanced
telecommunications for schools and libraries or for rural or economically underdeveloped areas; reinstating the Telecommunications Education Trust (TET) to
fund programs to inform the public about
telecommunications services and programs; funding outreach to inform qualified consumers about low-cost phone service through the Universal Lifeline program; and flowing the refund through to
ratepayers in the form of reduced phone
rates. [14:2&3 CRLR 217; 14:1 CRLR
167; 13:4 CRLR 2041
On August 8, the PUC announced that
$7.9 million of the now $50 million fund
will be refunded directly to Pacific Bell
ratepayers on a pro rata basis through a
surcredit on monthly bills; $40 million
will be used for telecommunications programs and facilities in public schools
statewide; and $2.1 million will be used to
continue the TET. According to Commissioner P. Gregory Conlon, funding telecommunications infrastructure for schools
is appropriate because it is an effective
way to stimulate the development of an
20
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advanced telecommunications infrastructure for California, and benefits California's
telecommunications users. In conjunction
with its decision, the PUC extended the
term of the TET program until December
31, 1996.
PUC Commissioners Patricia Eckert
and Norman Shumway opposed this allocation of the $50 million fund; in her
dissent, Eckert opined that "the $50.3 million must all be refunded to Pacific Bell's
ratepayers under California law." According to Eckert, "refunding all of the monies
to Pacific Bell's current ratepayers is the
option most clearly supported by California law and Commission practices." Among
other things, Eckert expressed concern
that the allocation to the schools has the
attributes of a tax, which the Commission
has no authority to impose; Eckert was
also critical of the plan's redistribution of
money from one service territory to another franchise territory, stating that Pacific Bell's former ratepayers will presumably end up funding schools statewide,
including those in GTE California's and
the other local exchange companies' territory.
TURN and the legislature, through Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, have both
filed petitions for rehearing with the Commission which are pending at this writing.
If denied, as anticipated, both may be expected to petition for California Supreme
Court for review. In the filed briefs seeking rehearing, TURN argues that any assessed funds should be returned to ratepayers. The legislature argues that any
funds not returned to ratepayers must be
deposited in the general fund. The challenge
here presented will turn on the authority of
the PUC to give restitution to ratepayers
directly-that is, through what are called cv
pres grants. Substantial authority supports
such an equitable option for courts (State of
California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal.
3d 460 (1986)), particularly where direct
restitution to all victims is impractical and
one of the goals of restitution is disgorgement of the defendant's "unjust enrichment." There is also authority that the
PUC exercises all of the equitable powers
of a court in its adjudicatory capacity
(Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v.
PUC, 25 Cal. 3d 891 (1979)). The Commission is also likely to cite the powers
delegated to it in Article XII, sections 2, 5,
and 6 of the State Constitution, and sections 701, 734-36 of the Public Utilities
Code, which give the Commission broad
authority, including authority over "reparation" collection and awards.
PUC Overturns AL's Discovery
Order. On April 1, PUC ALJ Robert L.
Ramsey ordered the California Cable
02

Television Association (CCTA) to comply
with discovery requests filed by Pacific
Bell, which would require CCTA to disclose member information concerning deployment of fiber optic cable and intentions to provide telecommunications services which would compete directly with
local exchange carriers such as Pacific
Bell. CCTA, a professional association
comprised of over 350 California cable
system operators, opposed the discovery
requests on the grounds that the information is irrelevant to the underlying proceeding, is privileged, and consists of materials which the association does not
maintain and cannot legally be compelled
to gather from its membership. CCTA appealed the decision to the full Commission. 114:2&3 CRLR 217]
On June 24, ALJ John S. Wong stayed
ALJ Ramsey's April I ruling until the
Commission could address the merits of
CCTA's appeal. According to Wong, the
discovery dispute in this proceeding "involves the extent to which a trade association's membership is subject to discovery
when only the trade association is a party
to a Commission proceeding." Noting the
"potential impact of this issue in other
Commission proceedings," Wong opined
that "this is an issue that should be resolved by the Commission in advance of
any decision on the merits of the petition
for modification...."
On August 3, the PUC issued its decision resolving CCTA's appeal; initially,
the PUC noted that its decision is a "rare
occurrence" in that the Commission is
normally reluctant to review evidentiary
and procedural rulings before the proceeding has been submitted. However, the
PUC decided to review the appeal in this
proceeding because of the possible ramifications the ruling could have in other
proceedings where an association is a
party.
In determining whether-in the context of a discovery order-it may compel
an association to provide answers from its
members, the PUC noted that Public Utilities Code section 1794 provides that
"[t]he Commission or any Commissioner
or any party may, in any investigation or
hearing before the Commission, cause the
deposition of witnesses residing within or
without the state to be taken in the manner
prescribed by law for like depositions in
civil actions in the superior courts of this
state and to that end may compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
books, waybills, documents, papers, and
accounts." The PUC then noted that the
discovery procedures available in civil
courts depend on the relationship or status
of the person from whom discovery is

sought; for a party to a proceeding, a wide
range of discovery procedures are available (e.g., interrogatories, requests for admission, document production), while discovery of one who is not a party to the
action is somewhat more limited (e.g.,
depositions with or without a subpoena
duces tecum).
Pacific Bell and GTEC argued that
CCTA's participation in this proceeding is
analogous to a class action suit, in which
members of the represented class are subject to discovery. However, the PUC concluded that class actions are distinguishable from an association's participation in
proceedings before it, stating that "[tihe
most distinguishing factor is that in a class
action, the class suit is brought so that the
class representative and the class members can obtain a share of the damages, or
of a common fund...." However, in a PUC
proceeding, "an association and its members are not awarded any damages. Instead, associations participate in Commission proceedings because the rules or regulations at issue in a proceeding may impact the financial relationship between the
utility and the association's members."
The PUC concluded that members of an
association should not automatically be
subject to discovery as a party merely
because they are members of an association. This judgment rejects Pacific Bell's
argument, notwithstanding substantial
precedential support, that an association is
not a separate entity but a joint activity of
its membership taken in concert, existing
only to serve individual interests, and warranting heightened scrutiny (not privacy
dispensation) because of the power of a
combination.
The PUC noted that ALJ Ramsey's
ruling requires "each member of CCTA"
to provide answers to certain discovery
requests, and "conclude[d] that the Commission cannot compel an association to
require its individual members to answer
data requests." According to the PUC, one
of the principal purposes of discovery is
to enable the discovering party to obtain
evidence from one's adversary who has
control of the information in question, and
"[i]f information is being sought from individual members, it is unlikely that the
association possesses or has control over
that sort of information." However, the
PUC also held that to the extent that ALJ
Ramsey's ruling requires responses by
CCTA itself, the Commission will require
CCTA to provide answers to those requests. Consumer advocates are critical of
this ruling, contending that it encourages
powerful associations to act as buffers,
impeding information disclosure for informed decisions.
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The PUC also addressed CCTA's contention that the information sought by one
of the requested items seeks information
protected by the attorney-client privilege
because it is seeking communications between CCTA members and its attorneys
concerning their individual positions on
CCTA's intervention in the instant case.
The PUC noted that the request in question seeks the identity of those CCTA
members who have authorized or refrained from authorizing CCTA from acting in this proceeding. According to the
PUC, this request "merely seeks to identify the clients on whose behalf CCTA is
acting, a matter which is not privileged as
was noted in ALJ Ramsey's ruling." The
PUC concluded that "[tlhe disclosure of
who CCTA is acting on behalf of will not
result in the disclosure of any of those
member's communications" and "does
not impinge on any communication made
in confidence in connection with the attorney-client privilege."
FCC Promulgates Rules for Interstate Caller ID. On April 18, the FCC
established regulations for interstate Caller ID; the rules are scheduled to become
effective on April 12, 1995, and will preempt state law only with regard to calls
made between states. Because the federal
standards are less restrictive than current
California Caller ID regulations, the PUC
is faced with the prospect of either forcing
the telephone service providers to develop
two sets of standards or modifying its regulations to conform to the federal model.
114:2&3 CRLR 218]
The new regulations, which will appear as 47 C.F.R. Part 64.1600-64.1604,
provide that any common carrier using the
SS7 switching technology must transmit
the calling party's number with all interstate calls (SS7 is the technology that
makes Caller ID service possible). The
rules further provide that all common carriers must provide a free per-call blocking
option for all such calls. There is no provision for per-line blocking. All common
carriers must use the code *67, dialed as
the first three digits of the call, as the
per-call blocking code (described by the
FCC as the caller's "request for privacy").
The receiving carrier must, with specified
exceptions, ensure that calls blocked in
this fashion are not disclosed. No common
carrier may charge any customer for the
call-blocking service. Finally, any common carrier using SS7 technology must
notify all customers that their phone numbers may be identified to a called party,
and inform customers how to maintain
privacy by using the *67 function.
The FCC rules differ from those developed by the PUC in 1992 [13:1 CRLR

135] in that the PUC ordered telephone
companies to offer three free blocking options: per-call blocking, per-line blocking,
and per-line blocking with per-call enabling. Per-line blocking is viewed as essential for customers with unlisted phone
numbers who wish to keep their numbers
private. However, the FCC declined to
require a per-line blocking option because
of a concern that, in emergencies, a caller
would forget to disable the blocking and
prevent emergency response teams from
quickly identifying the caller. The PUC
also requires companies to establish an
extensive customer notification and education program. To date, no major telephone corporation in California has elected
to provide Caller ID service.
During the summer, over fifty petitions
for reconsideration were filed with the
FCC from state attorneys general, associations, public interest groups, and carriers.
Additionally, the PUC petitioned the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn
the FCC's rulemaking order, on the basis
that it was reached in a manner that violates the procedural requirements prescribed by the federal Administrative Procedure Act; however, the PUC later requested that the court delay action on its
petition pending the outcome of the reconsideration petitions. At this writing, the
FCC has taken no official action in response to the petitions; the PUC is expected to pursue its court action if the
reconsideration petitions are not resolved
to its satisfaction.
Pacific Telesis Strikes Alliance with
Key Minority and Consumer Group.
On July 14, Pacific Telesis and Pacific Bell
signed an agreement with the Greenlining
Coalition, which was formed to protect
minorities from "redlining" practices of
banks, insurance companies, and other
businesses; under the agreement, the two
groups will work together to bring telephone service to more Californians. Specifically, Pacific Bell will consider implementing a multilingual marketing plan
for Universal Lifeline Telephone Service;
developing and marketing products and
services that will enable customers to better control their phone bills; and offering
a "warm" or "quick" dial tone service, so
that even if phone service has not been
ordered, a "warm" or "quick" dial tone
would allow an occupant to plug in his/her
phone to call Pacific Bell's business office
to make phone service arrangements or to
call 911 in emergencies.
New Federal Law Interrupts PUC
Review of General Freight Transportation Regulation. On August 23, President
Clinton signed H.R. 2739 (Oberstar), federal legislation which generally preempts
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state regulation of the price, route, or service of motor carriers transporting property and air carriers transporting property
by motor vehicle. Generally, the federal
law, known as Public Law No. 103-305,
deregulates the transportation of general
freight; cement; livestock; rock, sand, and
gravel (by dump truck); motor vehicles in
secondary truckaway movement; trailer
coaches, campers, and recreational vehicles; agricultural products; commodities
carried in tank trucks and vacuum tank
trucks; and transportation currently exempt from California rate regulations. The
law also applies to private carriers and
integrated intermodal small package (IISP)
carriers.
However, the new law, which takes
effect on January 1, 1995, does not affect
the states' authority to license and regulate
the safety and financial responsibility of
these carriers, nor does it preempt the
states from regulating any aspect of the
transportation of household goods. Accordingly, a state may still impose highway route controls, limitations based on
the size and weight of the motor vehicle,
controls on hazardous cargo, minimum
insurance requirements, and self-insurance authorization. Also, states may continue to regulate uniform cargo liability
rules, uniform bills of lading or receipts
for property being transported, uniform
cargo credit rules, antitrust immunity for
joint line rates or routs, and classifications
and mileage guides, provided that the
states' laws, regulations, or provisions are
no more burdensome than compliance
with the federal statutory provisions or
regulations adopted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the statutory provisions.
The "deregulation-regulation" struggle over trucking does not involve direct
health and safety regulation, where both
federal and state regulators have had and
retain substantial authority. The dispute
pertains to pricing: Carriers contend that
they should be licensed narrowly by type
of carriage and area, and competitors
barred unless current carriers are unable to
carry the volume offered; that they should
be allowed to meet together by type of
carrier and region and collectively and
privately propose rates (rate bureaus); and
that the PUC should review those rates for
fairness and enforce them as minimum
rates. The carriers have argued since the
1930s that these restrictions and minimum
rates are needed to prevent "destructive
competition," predatory pricing, inadequate investment in safety, excessive driving hours, and lack of stable carriage for
shippers. Consumer advocates, market
conservatives, and economists combined
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to condemn the restrictions and minimum
prices as horizontal price fixing in an industry particularly amenable to competition. Substantial studies conducted over
the past twenty years have generally favored the latter position, documenting
substantial waste (empty backhauls), excessive prices, inefficiency, and little correlation between rates and safety or other
social benefits; much of this evidence has
been presented to the Commission over
the past decade. [11:3 CRLR 192; 10:4
CRLR 180-81; 6:1 CRLR 7]
The PUC replicated the much-criticized federal system of trucking regulation until the 1970s when deregulation
policies began to take hold nationally. The
PUC then followed the federal lead in
deregulation until 1980. It then curiously
began an eight-year period of "re-regulation," permitting most of the practices rejected federally, with then-Commissioner
Gravelle strongly dissenting. Since 1988,
the PUC has once again considered a shift
back toward deregulation, but economists
and consumer advocates contend that it
retains significant anticompetitive features.
The PUC has separated out different
classes of carriers throughout its history
for disparate regulatory treatment-common carriers (those who hold themselves
out generally for carriage) and contract
carriers (those who haul for a particular
shipper or shipper group). Common carriers are subject to greater regulation. The
PUC has separated out common carriers
traditionally by type, e.g., household
goods, livestock, logging, dump trucks,
cement haulers, petroleum, and "general
freight." General freight, as the largest
category, no longer has the once intrusive
limitations on type of truck, commodities
allowed to be carried, entry, and prices
which may not be varied. However, the
system in place allows rate bureaus to
continue, and rates must be filed before
they can be charged, with at least ten days'
advance notice allowed. The PUC has reduced its role as the enforcer of minimum
rates, but economists and consumer advocates argue that where the PUC allows
collusion and requires advance notice of
any rate decrease, it creates what they call
"an advance detection mechanism" for
those in a combination to enforce its
terms. The result is likely to be the same.
The PUC has allegedly turned from the
enforcer of private rate-fixing to a passive
but tolerant facilitator. Meanwhile, other
critics contend that the tariffs have become so complex that experts must be
hired to interpret them.
Complicating matters further, the PUC
created a new class of general freight com204
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mon carrier, effective January 1, 1994the llSPCarrier. [14:2&3 CRLR 218; 13:4
CRLR 210-11] IISP carriers are those carrying small packages (under 150 pounds)
who also have an intermodal (air/ground)
transport capacity, such as Federal Express. This class is exempt from price regulation in the true sense, as intended from
federal trucking deregulation. There are
no rate bureaus, antitrust law fully applies,
rates need not be filed prior to charge, and
there are no minimum rates (except for the
unfair and predatory competition standards applicable to all). Knowing that almost half of general freight truck carriage
involves small packages, the carriers without airplane capacity complained that they
were being undercut in price. They had to
file and wait ten days to meet a lower price
which a IISP carrier could quote over the
phone. Accordingly, AB 2015 (Moore)
(Chapter 1226, Statutes of 1993) required
the PUC to examine the impact of the new
truly deregulated class of carrier on those
subject to remaining regulation. In 1.9403-036, the Commission started such an
inquiry. Now, because of the federal legislation, the PUC proceeding is in doubt;
currently, the PUC is examining the new
federal law to determine its effect on PUC
regulations and whether this rulemaking
proceeding is necessary.
If the federal statute operates to end
"rate bureaus," voluntary collusion, and
required tariff filing, it will mean substantial change for most categories of California trucking, and the devolution of all
trucking to the open status of the new lISP
carrier. Such a required devolution is
clearly what the federal legislation intends
and appears to require. The one exception
in the federal law for household goods
carriers is significant: California retains
substantial anticompetitive regulation of
household goods carriage, including high
minimum rates based on $40 to $50 per
hour wages to loaders and drivers.
Rules on Disqualification of ALJs.
On August 3, the PUC adopted Rule 63.1
et seq., Article 16, Title 20 of the CCR,
which sets forth procedures governing the
disqualification of its ALJs for bias or
prejudice. t14:2&3 CRLR 218] The rules
set forth the grounds which qualify for
ALJ disqualification, grounds which do
not qualify for disqualification, and the
procedures for disqualifying an ALJ,
which may be accomplished by the ALJ or
upon the motion of any party.
During the 45-day public comment period, comments were submitted by TURN
and PG&E; according to the PUC, these
comments largely restated arguments regarding an ALJ's knowledge of disputed
facts, peremptory challenges, and the ex

parte rule which were previously considered in the revised rules. Although TURN
favored a rule that would disqualify an
ALJ if he/she has personal knowledge,
acquired in a capacity other than that of an
AL, of disputed evidentiary facts conceming the proceeding, the PUC rejected
this recommendation because it would
disqualify an ALJ if he/she acquired
knowledge of the disputed facts as a former member of the PUC staff. Many staff
members are promoted to ALJ after acquiring technical knowledge of many issues and, therefore, many ALJs would
have some knowledge of the disputed
facts.
Various groups favored affording parties a peremptory challenge which would
allow for automatic disqualification of a
judge on the filing of an affidavit alleging
a good faith belief that ajudge is biased or
prejudiced-analogous to common court
procedure. The proposed rules initially did
not include peremptory challenges and
PG&E was one of five parties supporting
the inclusion of such a procedure; PG&E
suggested that peremptory challenges at
least be adopted for complaint cases and
preferably for "quasi-legislative" proceedings as well.
The PUC agreed to allow such a
challenge in adjudicatory "complaint"
proceedings.
The rules also include a ban on exparte
communications regarding the assignment, reassignment, or disqualification of
a particular ALJ; PG&E did not favor this
ban, contending that exparte communications regarding disqualification should be
subject to the Commission's existing
rules. However, the PUC prudently decided that it is important to prohibit ex
parte communications on the subject of
who is to hear or decide a case in order to
maintain the integrity of the decisionmaking process, and will apply the prohibition
accordingly.

U

LEGISLATION
ACR 143 (Sher), as amended August
27, 1994, expresses concern that the Commission has not developed a sufficient factual record in its proceeding to deregulate
the electric services industry (see MAJOR
PROJECTS), and urges the PUC to issue
no interim, final, or effective order until it
has held evidentiary hearings and made
specified reports to the legislature and the
Governor. These reports include the following:
-proposed policies regarding performance-based ratemaking and electric industry restructuring proceedings, including a definition of the base revenue requirements providing the starting point for
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measuring utility performance and achieving rate reductions, and policies providing
customer choice and fair generation competition;
-a report on how those policies, including policies affecting direct access
and reciprocity of service opportunity in
other states and countries, conflict with
state or federal law, and suggestions on
how to resolve those conflicts;
-a quantification, following evidentiary hearings, on the competition transition surcharges for each utility and the
allocation of those charges among shareholders, classes of ratepayers, and direct
access and utility service customers;
-an identification and quantification of
options, both through rates and through
alternative funding arrangements, to pay
for low-income ratepayer assistance, economic development, fuel diversity and renewable resource development, demandside management, environmental protection, low-emission vehicle development,
and women- and minority-owned business programs; and
-a report on how those policies and
programs affect existing investment in
nonutility electric power generation and
the climate for new investment in that
generation.
ACR 143 further establishes the Joint
Oversight Committee on Lowering the
Cost of Electric Services, consisting of at
least three and not more than five members
appointment by the Assembly Speaker, and
at least three and not more than five members of appointed by the Senate Rules
Committee, to ensure that the proposals
made by the PUC meet the criteria outlined in ACR 143; ensure that the legislature is properly consulted and involved in
policies proposed by the Commission to
deregulate the electric services industry;
and provide a mechanism for the legislature to work with the Governor, the Commission, the California Energy Commission, and other parties on the most effective strategy for achieving lower utility
rates, fair competition, improved environmental protection, and resource diversity.
SB 1630 (Hart), as amended June 21,
requires local telephone corporations in
the state, excluding wireless or cellular
corporations, to provide, to the extent permitted by existing technology or facilities,
all existing and newly installed telephone
connections to residential households
with access to "911" emergency service
regardless of whether an account has been
established, and prohibits telephone corporations from terminating access to these
services for nonpayment of any delinquent account or indebtedness owed by
the subscriber to the telephone corpora-

tion. This bill was signed by the Governor
on September 15 (Chapter 612, Statutes of
1994).
SB 1709 (Peace). Existing law provides that whenever a public utility and a
cable television corporation or association
of cable television corporations are unable
to agree upon the terms, conditions, or
annual compensation for pole attachments
or the terms, conditions, or costs of rearrangements, the PUC shall establish and
enforce the rates, terms, and conditions for
pole attachments and rearrangements so
as to assure a public utility the recovery of
specified funds. As amended July 5, this
bill states the intent of the legislature that
public utilities and publicly owned utilities be fairly and adequately compensated
for the use of their rights-of-way and
easements for the installation of fiber optic
cable, and that electric public utilities and
publicly owned utilities have the ability, if
they so desire, to negotiate access to those
fiber optic cables, for their own use, and
makes findings and declarations in that
regard. This bill was signed by the Governor on September 17 (Chapter 623, Statutes of 1994).
AB 3610 (Moore). Existing law requires the PUC to design and implement
programs whereby each telephone corporation shall provide a telecommunications
device capable of servicing the needs of
individuals who are deaf or hearing impaired, and to establish a rate recovery
mechanism through a surcharge to be in
effect until January 1, 1995. As introduced
February 25, this bill extends that surcharge until January 1, 1997. This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 15
(Chapter 608, Statutes of 1994).
AB 727 (Moore). Existing law requires the PUC, in granting an operating
permit or a certificate to a charter-party
carrier, to require the carrier to maintain
adequate liability insurance. As amended
April 14, this bill prohibits any agency or
local government from requiring any person, firm, or corporation holding a valid
permit as a charter-party carrier to provide
insurance in a manner different from that
required by the Commission.
This bill prohibits the governing body
of an airport from imposing a fee based on
gross receipts of charter-party carriers operating limousines. This bill prohibits a
charter-party carrier from operating a limousine, as defined, unless the limousine is
equipped with special license plates issued and distributed by the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV), and requires the
PUC to issue a permit or certificate for
limousine service. This bill requires a
charter-party carrier operating a limousine
to state the number of its permit or license
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plate in every written or oral advertisement. These provisions become operative
on July 1, 1995.
Existing law makes it unlawful for the
owner of a charter-party carrier of passenger motor vehicles employing or otherwise directing the driver of the vehicle to
permit operation of the vehicle upon a
public highway for compensation without
first complying with vehicle identification
requirements under a specified provision
of law. This bill, in addition, makes it
unlawful to permit the operation of any
such vehicle without having complied
with specified provisions requiring the
display of a decal or special license plates.
This provision will become operative on
July 1, 1995.
This bill requires every limousine operated by a charter-party carrier to display
a special identification license plate issued
by the DMV. This provision will become
operative on July 1, 1995.
This bill requires the PUC to fund the
costs of administering the special identification license plate program required by
this bill, including the costs of the DMV,
from the Public Utilities Commission
Transportation Reimbursement Account.
This bill requires the DMV and the
PUC to adopt a memorandum of understanding by January I, 1995, governing
the exchange of information on vehicle
registrations and reimbursement by the
Commission of the DMV's costs in producing and distributing special identification license plates for limousines as required by this bill. This bill was signed by
the Governor on June 24 (Chapter 109,
Statutes of 1994).
The following is a status update on
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 14,
Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1994) at pages
219-22:
AB 2840 (Solis). Existing law states
that the PUC's meetings shall be open and
public and sets forth certain requirements
in that regard. As amended August 26, this
bill would have additionally required the
PUC to schedule public participation
meetings for hearing public opinion on
various public utilities' rates or services.
This bill was vetoed by Governor Wilson
on September 27; according to Wilson,
"this bill proposes to micromanage the
operations of the [PUC] by mandating the
method it must use to elicit the concerns
of utility ratepayers. The bill's requirement that the Commission conduct as
many as 20 meetings around the State each
year, in addition to its other public meetings, constitutes overreaching."
AB 2850 (Escutia). Existing law requires the PUC, upon scheduling hearings
and specifying the scope of issues to be
20
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heard in any proceeding involving an electrical, gas, telephone, railroad, or water
corporation, or a highway carrier, to assign an ALJ to preside over the hearings,
either sitting alone or assisting the Commissioner or Commissioners who will
hear the case. Existing law permits the
PUC, in issuing its decision, to adopt,
modify, or set aside the proposed decision
of the ALJ or any part of that decision.
Every finding, opinion, and order made in
the proposed decision and approved or
confirmed by the Commission shall, upon
that approval or confirmation, be the finding, opinion, and order of the Commission. As amended August 22, this bill requires, with a specified exception, beginning January 1, 1995, any item appearing
on the PUC's public agenda as an alternate
item, as defined, to an ALJ's proposed
decision to be served upon all parties to
the proceeding and be subject to public
review and comment before it may be
voted upon. The bill also requires that,
prior to commencement of any meeting at
which Commissioners vote on items on
the public agenda, the PUC make available to the public copies of the agenda and,
upon request, any agenda item documents
that are proposed to be considered at a
Commission meeting. This bill was signed
by the Governor on September 28 (Chapter 1110, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1957 (Rosenthal). Existing law
states that the PUC's meetings shall be
open and public in accordance with the
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act; with
respect to the PUC, that Act provides that
the requirement that the public be provided an opportunity to address the Commission on each agenda item does not
apply to agenda items that involve decisions of the Commission regarding adjudicatory hearings. As amended June 27,
this bill would have deleted that exemption, prohibited serial, rotating, or seriatim
meetings, and defined the term "meeting."
This bill also would have prohibited certain ex parte communications regarding
proceedings conducted by the Commission; required that, prior to commencement of any meeting at which Commissioners vote on items on the public
agenda, the PUC make available to the
public copies of the agenda and any other
writings distributed to all or a majority of
the Commissioners for discussion or consideration at the meeting, and prohibited
the PUC from voting on certain alternate
public agenda items to proposed decisions
of ALJs until those items and a summary
of the substantive changes proposed in the
proposed decision of the ALJ by those
items, have been made available to the
public.
206

Provisions from three other bills-SB
1956 (Rosenthal) (subjecting any non-social gathering of a quorum of PUC members to the requirements of the BagleyKeene Open Meeting Law), AB 2840
(Solis) (requiring the PUC to schedule
public participation hearings in the service
territory of every utility under its jurisdiction), and AB 2850 (Escutia) (requiring
various documents related to public hearings to be furnished to the public before
the meeting or voting)-were amended
into this bill late in the legislative session.
This bill was vetoed by Governor Wilson
on July 20; according to Wilson, "[tihis
measure is poorly conceived, and superficially addresses the serious procedural reform issues confronting the Commission,
and unnecessarily burdens the decisionmaking process with unworkable mandates while ignoring the far-reaching procedural and structural reform recommendations made by the Advisory Working
Group" chaired by former PUC President
Don Vial. [14:2&3 CRLR 3, 214]
AB 3720 (Costa), SB 1966 (Calderon), and AB 3606 (Moore) implement
some of the Commission's recommendations made in Enhancing California's
Competitive Strength: A Strategyfor Telecommunications Infrastructure, the PUC's
December 1993 report to the Governor in
which it proposed sweeping changes in
the state regulatory structure of the telecommunications industry, including a call
for open competition in all telecommunications markets by January I, 1997. [14:1
CRLR 168-69]
- AB 3720 (Costa), as amended July 7,
requires the PUC to require competitive
intrastate interexchange telecommunications service, subject to specified conditions. The bill also requires the PUC to
pursue all reasonable and necessary legislative and judicial actions to open California's intrastate interexchange markets
to full competition. These provisions will
be known as the California Long Distance
Telecommunications Consumer Choice
Act. This bill was signed by the Governor
on September 27 (Chapter 934, Statutes of
1994).
- SB 1966 (Calderon). The Public
Utilities Act sets forth the findings and
declarations of the legislature that a policy
for telecommunications in California is,
among other things, to promote economic
growth, job creation, and the substantial
social benefits that will result from the
rapid implementation of advanced information and communications technologies
by assuring adequate long-term investment in the necessary infrastructure. As
amended August I1, this bill instead refers
to the rapid implementation of these tech-

nologies by adequate long-term investment in the necessary infrastructure. The
bill also declares that it is a policy of the
state to remove the barriers to open and
competitive markets and promote fair
product and price competition in a way
that encourages greater efficiency, lower
prices, and more consumer choice. This
bill was signed by the Governor on September 30 (Chapter 1284, Statutes of
1994).
- AB 3606 (Moore), as amended August 17, makes a legislative finding and
declaration that a policy for telecommunications in California is to promote lower
prices, broader consumer choice, and
avoidance of anticompetitive conduct;
states the legislature's intent that all telecommunications markets subject to PUC
jurisdiction be opened to competition not
later than January 1, 1997, and that the
PUC take steps to ensure that competition
in telecommunications markets is fair and
that the state's universal service policy is
observed; provides that if any local exchange telephone company obtains the
right to offer cable television or video
dialtone service within its service territory
from aregulatory body or court of competent jurisdiction, any cable television corporation may immediately have the right
to enter into the local telecommunications
market within the service territory of that
local exchange carrier by filing for approval a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, if necessary, which shall be
expeditiously reviewed by the PUC; and
requires the Commission to expedite its
open network architecture and network
development, interconnection, and other
related dockets so that whatever additional rules and regulations that may be
necessary to achieve fair local exchange
competition shall be in place no later than
January 1, 1997. This bill was signed by
the Governor on September 30 (Chapter
1260, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1304 (Ayala). Existing law requires electrical corporations to make
available to qualifying heavy industrial
customers optional interruptible or curtailable service, at a rate to reflect a pricing
incentive. As amended May 10, this bill
requires the PUC to direct each public
utility electrical corporation to renew its
efforts to reduce the rates charged heavy
industrial customers to a level competitive
with other states, and requires each electrical corporation to report to the PUC no
later than June 30, 1995, on those measures or practices it has identified that
would permit it to reduce its firm service
rates for heavy industrial customers to the
level of its interruptible or curtailable service rates provided to those customers as
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of January 30, 1993. This bill also expresses legislative findings and declarations and state the legislative intent with
respect to these provisions. This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 22
(Chapter 752, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1456 (Rosenthal), as amended
June 23, requires the PUC to authorize
public utilities to establish catastrophic
event memorandum accounts and to record in those accounts specified costs that
would be recoverable in rates following a
request by the affected utility, a finding of
their reasonableness, and approval by the
Commission. The bill also requires the
PUC to hold expedited proceedings in response to utility applications to recover
costs associated with catastrophic events.
This bill was signed by the Governor on
September 29 (Chapter 1156, Statutes of
1994).
AB 2837 (Baca), as introduced February 14, would have prohibited the PUC
from ordering an electrical or gas corporation to put low-income energy services
out for bid, and rescinded any such orders
made prior to January 1, 1995. This bill
was vetoed by Governor Wilson on July
20; Wilson opined that "[i]t would be wholly
inappropriate to enact a statute which limits
the ability to protect ratepayers' from noncompetitively derived costs."
AB 3704 (Bronshvag). Existing law
prescribes the circumstances under which
telephone corporations can release information regarding residential subscribers
without their consent in writing. As amended
April 11, this bill permits release of information relating to Universal Lifeline Telephone Service customers to public utilities
for the sole purpose of low-income ratepayer assistance outreach efforts. This bill
was signed by the Governor on July 15
(Chapter 214, Statutes of 1994).
AB 3643 (Polanco), as amended May
2, requires the PUC to initiate an investigation and open a proceeding to examine
the current and future definitions of universal service in telecommunications; and
requires the PUC to report to the legislature by January 1, 1996, on its findings and
recommendations. This bill was signed by
the Governor on July 20 (Chapter 278,
Statutes of 1994).
SB 1939 (Rosenthal), as amended August 25, requires the PUC to extend special programs for up to a three-year period
to encourage telecommuting in the area of
the state affected by the Northridge earthquake of 1994. The bill requires the PUC
to initiate an investigation into the establishment of special telecommunications
programs to encourage telecommuting in
the entire state, and report to the legislature its findings and recommendations by

December 1, 1995. This bill was signed by
the Governor on September 27 (Chapter
943, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1998 (Kopp), as amended July 2,
requires the PUC to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of requiring telephone corporations to bill in increments
shorter than one minute and report to the
legislature not later than December 31,
1995. This bill was signed by the Governor on September 19 (Chapter 677, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1960 (Rosenthal), as amended August 26, this bill would have, until January
1,2010, enacted the Rosenthal-Moore Educational Technology Act of 1994, and
established the Golden State Education
Network Foundation, with specified membership. This bill would have made an
appropriation of $40 million from any
moneys received by the PUC pursuant to
a specified decision of the Commission
for purposes of the Rosenthal-Moore Educational Technology Act of 1994. This
bill was vetoed by the Governor on September 30.
AB 1879 (Bornstein) and AB 1879
(Peace). Existing law requires the PUC to
designate a baseline quantity of electricity
and gas, as defined, necessary for a significant portion of the reasonable energy
needs of the average residential customer.
The Commission is also required to establish a standard limited allowance of gas
and electricity to which specified residential customers are entitled in addition to
the baseline quantity. As amended August
25, these bills would have included within
the category of residential customers to
whom the additional limited allowance of
electricity applies, until December 31,
1997, customers 62 years of age or older
who reside in extreme climatic zones, as
defined; prohibited the cost of this limited
additional allowance from being borne
solely by any single class of customer; and
established a different baseline quantity of
electricity for those customers. Both bills
were vetoed by the Governor on September 24.
AB 3524 (Bowler). Under existing
law, the furnishing of specified passenger
transportation services by a charter-party
carrier of passengers is subject to the
PUC's jurisdiction and control. These services are required to be furnished pursuant
to a certificate of public convenience and
necessity or a permit issued by the Commission, subject to specified filing fees.
Existing law limits these permits to service areas with mileage restrictions. As
amended June 23, this bill alters these
mileage restrictions for designated permits, and revises the amount of filing fees
for a specified classification.
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Existing law sets forth the requirements to be met before a permit or certificate may be issued for charter-party carriers of passengers. This bill makes these
provisions applicable to the issuance or
renewal of permits, and sets forth certain
requirements to be met before a certificate
may be issued or renewed. This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 9
(Chapter 456, Statutes of 1994).
AB 3589 (Rainey), as amended August 8, specifically requires the PUC to
establish just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory minimum rates for dump
truck carriers and adjust the rates of those
carriers to reflect costs that have increased
or decreased since the rates were last adjusted; requires the PUC to establish or
approve expedited rate deviation procedures for dump truck carriers; and authorizes the PUC to approve applications by
dump truck carriers for deviations from
those minimum rates. This bill became
law without the Governor's signature on
October 4 (Chapter 1299, Statutes of
1994).
AB 3332 (Conroy). Existing law provides that when the PUC's executive director determines that any household
goods carrier, passenger stage corporation, highway common carrier or cement
carrier, or highway carrier, or any officer,
director, or agent of any household goods
carrier, passenger stage corporation, highway common carrier, or cement carrier, or
highway carrier, is failing or omitting or
about to fail or omit to do anything required of it by law, or by any order, decision, rule, direction, or requirement of the
Commission, or is doing anything or
about to do anything, or permitting anything or about to permit anything to be
done, in violation of law or of any order,
decision, role, direction, or requirement of
the commission, the executive director
may make application to the superior
court for injunctive relief, a restraining
order, or other order, upon a showing by
the executive director that a person or
corporation has engaged in or is about to
engage in these acts or practices. As
amended June 28, this bill specifically
includes within the type of order that the
court may grant an order allowing vehicles used for subsequent operations subject to the order to be impounded at the
carrier's expense and subject to release
only by subsequent court order following
a petition to the court by the defendant or
owner of the vehicle. This bill was signed
by the Governor on September 9 (Chapter
457, Statutes of 1994).
AB 2333 (Morrow), as amended March
3, requires telephone, gas, and electric
utilities to provide district attorney inspec-
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tors and investigators with limited customer information under specified conditions with respect to investigations relating to missing or abducted children. The
bill requires inspectors and investigators
requesting this information to prepare and
sign a written affidavit supporting the request, and provides that specified persons
and entities shall not be subject to criminal
or civil liability for reasonably relying on
an affidavit pursuant to this provision.
This bill was signed by the Governor on
June 24 (Chapter 112, Statutes of 1994).
AB 766 (Hauser), as amended April
21, requires the PUC to undertake a propane safety inspection and enforcement
program for propane distribution systems
to ensure compliance with the federal
pipeline standards by propane operators
within the state, and permits the PUC to
adopt rules, at least as stringent as the
federal law, in order to protect the health
and safety of customers served by propane
distribution systems. This bill requires the
State Board of Equalization and the PUC
to establish a uniform billing surcharge
designed to cover the cost of implementing these provisions. This bill was signed
by the Governor on August 31 (Chapter
388, Statutes of 1994).
AB 860 (Pringle), as amended July 4,
SB 141 (Alquist), as amended July 9, and
AB 2028 (Statham), as amended July 1,
are no longer relevant to the PUC.
The following bills died in committee:
SB 1325 (Kopp), which would have expressed legislative intent to eliminate the
original review jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court over PUC decisions
and authorize judicial review of PUC proceedings in either the Supreme Court or a
court of appeal; SB 1956 (Rosenthal),
which would have subjected PUC agenda
items regarding adjudicatory hearings to
the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, and
prohibited serial, rotating, or seriatim meetings; AB 2737 (Cannella), which would
have required public utilities to provide to
peace officers and to federal investigators
and law enforcement officers with names,
prior addresses, places of employment,
and dates of service of utility customers
under specified conditions; AB 3767
(Andal), which would have authorized the
PUC to determine that some or all nondominant telephone corporations shall be
subject to registration-only regulation,
subject to specified conditions, and set
forth the duties and authority of the PUC
in regulating these corporations (see
MAJOR PROJECTS); SB 1962 (Rosenthal), which would have required the PUC
to maintain a telecommunications education program similar to its existing Telecommunications Education Trust (TET)

to protect the interests of California consumers; ACR 131 (Escutia), which would
have requested the PUC to conduct a study
on at-grade railroad crossings from the
Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to
downtown Los Angeles; AB 3452 (Mountjoy), which would have required the PUC
to establish onlyjust, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates for dump truck carriers; SB 320 (Rosenthal), which would
have permitted the PUC to expand the
funding base of the Universal Lifeline
Telephone Service program surcharge;
AB 1386 (Moore), which would haveamong other things-required the PUC to
cause a gas corporation to publish a tariff
establishing terms and conditions of
wholesale gas service for a municipality
within its service territory (including
rates); SB 662 (Bergeson), which would
have required the PUC, in consultation
with specified departments and representatives, to prepare and adopt a program for
telecommunications services for disabled
persons for motorist aid in the event of a
freeway emergency; AB 2363 (Moore),
which would have permitted gas, heat, or
electrical corporations and their subsidiaries that are regulated as public utilities by
the PUC to conduct specified work if the
work is incidental to another utility function and is performed by a utility employee who is present on the premises for
the other function; and AB 173 (V. Brown),
which would have limited the amount of
salary paid to the President and each member of the PUC to an amount no greater
than the annual salary of members of the
legislature.
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FUTURE MEETINGS

The full Commission usually meets
every other Wednesday in San Francisco.
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President: Margaret Morrow
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Herbert Rosenthal
(415) 561-8200 and
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Toll-Free Complaint Hotline:
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he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified
in the California Constitution at Article
V1, section 9. The State Bar was estab-

lished as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the
State Bar has over 141,000 members,
which equals approximately 17% of the
nation's population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the President-are elected to the Board by lawyers
in nine geographic districts. A representative of the California Young Lawyers Association (CYLA), appointed by that
organization's Board of Directors, also
sits on the Board. The six public members
are variously selected by the Governor,
Assembly Speaker, and Senate Rules
Committee, and confirmed by the state
Senate. Each Board member serves a
three-year term, except for the CYLA representative (who serves for one year) and
the Board President (who serves a fourth
year when elected to the presidency). The
terms are staggered to provide for the selection of five attorneys and two public
members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 291 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (I ) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are codified at section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, and promoting competence-based education; (3)
ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) improving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its new attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attorney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The
Bar recommends sanctions to the Califor-
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